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THE TRAGEDY OF FANATICISM.
BY CALVIN THOMAS.
BY the tragedy of fanaticism I mean a stage-play in which a well-
meaning hero makes havoc of his life because of his all too
strenuous devotion to a conviction or a rule of conduct which he
regards as supremely important. Observe that I lay some stress
on the intellectual and altruistic character of the moving impulse.
If the moving impulse is a selfish passion such as love, jealousy,
vindictiveness, or lust of power, there is no tragedy of fanaticism.
Shakespeare's Othello, Lear, Macbeth, Romeo, Richard the Third,
all make havoc of their lives under the push of a ruling passion,
but none of them is a fanatic. Brutus may seem to approach the
type, but Brutus is essentially a sober man. He joins in murderous
conspiracy and goes down at Philippi, but there is nothing fiercely
intemperate, nothing madly quixotic in his conduct. One feels
that he might have been successful. Such a man is hardly to be
classed with the fanatics.
Of course no very sharp and rigid distinction can be made
between that part of the tragic impulse which is intellectual and
that part which is emotional or temperamental. The two blend
more or less. We have found out that the human mind does not
consist of air-tight compartments one of which can be labeled
"volition," another "feeling," another "thought" etc. To change
the figure, these various psychic operations grow from a common
stem, and their branches are apt to intertwine. A personal smart
may easily develop into a conviction that the world is going wrong
;
just as personal comfort makes for an optimistic let-things-alone
philosophy. Being very much in love often fortifies a young man's
assurance that the soul is immortal. A gnawing in the stomach is
responsible for many a revolutionist. And so forth. Let it be
duly recognized at the outset that we are going to deal with some-
what loose distinctions such as belong to the language of literature
or of common life rather than to the language of very exact science.
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In a contribution to The Monist (July 1914), entitled "Tragedy
and the Enjoyment of It," I tried to account genetically for the
modern associations of the word "tragedy," and to explain, among
other things, how it came about that for Shakespeare and his con-
temporaries tragedy consisted mainly in the mimic representation of
murder and its consequences. What is here pertinent to note is
that in the entire tragic drama of the Renaissance the moving im-
pulse is usually selfish or individualistic. The hero is actuated by
one of the elemental instincts—love, jealousy, lust of power, or the
like—and does not think very much about the larger or remoter
consequences of his conduct. We find, to be sure, tragedies of pa-
triotism and tragedies of martyrdom, in which the hero may seem
to act or to endure in a spirit of pure devotion to a large idea.
But patriotism is itself almost an elemental instinct—the survival
in civilized man of the necessary tribal instinct of the primitive
savage—while passive endurance of any kind is hardly drama at
all. Furthermore, the martyr always regards his sufferings as the
price he must pay for celestial joys. His conduct is a kind of
sublimated selfishness looking to issues that are beyond the grave.
But when we come to the eighteenth century there is something
new. Much as that century has been derided by romanticists of one
kind or another, I am of those who regard it as on the whole the
most important epoch in human annals. Prior to that time the
leaders of thought had been able, in general, to think of nothing
better for mankind than a return to something that had been. Their
dream was always a going back—to Hebraism, to Hellenism, to
primitive Christianity. The Renaissance itself, in its origin at
least, was a r^-birth—the recovery of a forgotten past. But the
time had now come when the men of light and leading laid hold
on the idea of progress and began to locate their Golden Age in
the future. The idea was of course immensely fortified by Darwin
and his successors, and it was not until late in the nineteenth cen-
tury that its tremendous implications were fully and generally real-
ized. But essentially the idea of evolution was a legacy of the
eighteenth century. It was then that the cleavage began between
those who look backward and inward, trusting to a past authority,
and those who look forward and outward, trusting to the increase
of knowledge. Under the new light it was no longer sufficient to
have things as good as they had been before. Something far better
was to be attained.
Thus progress became the supreme, the all-embracing, criterion.
I would not have this word "progress" understood in any restricted
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sense, whether intellectual, economic, religious, or esthetic. It was
precisely one of the characteristics of eighteenth-century thinking
that this new dream of man's perfectibility—of a glorious height
to be reached in the long future by the symmetrical development
of human nature—was somewhat vague and chimerical. Perhaps
the dream was a little too iridescent. That does not matter, since
it has proved so immensely potent. Let us think of it in a very large
way as a dream of making the world a better place for better men
and women to come.
But now from this new point of view the most interesting
question in the ethical sphere was that of the individual's relation
to the social order. Does my conduct make for the general good
or not? Is the social order itself good or bad? If any of it is
bad, what is to be done about it? Shall I conform and temporize,
or shall I fight? Shall I follow my instincts and passions? Shall
I follow tradition? Shall I pin my faith to some theory, as for
exarnple a theory of the state of nature? Shall I attack the standards
of my immediate environment—for instance neighborhood morality
or church tradition—in the interest of liberty and enlightenment
for mankind at large? If I do, may I involve others in the painful
consequences of my quarrel with society?
Such were some of the questions forced to the front by the
evolutionary idea
—
problems born of man's short-sightedness. For
if we only knezv whether a given line of conduct would or would
not in the long run make for the good of mankind, we should have
an infallible rule of action ; and he who should set himself in oppo-
sition to it would be simply a criminal whose downfall, in real
life or on the stage, would impress us like the killing of an escaped
tiger or the death of a dangerous malefactor. But zve do not know.
What we do know is that the results of a man's action are often
sadly out of tune with his intentions. The bad man accomplishes
good, the Devil turns out to have been all the while a servant of
the Lord. And, alas, the noblest effort may bear a crop of evil in
its train. A humble carpenter's son in Judea devotes three years
of his life to going about among the poor, healing their diseases,
comforting them in their troubles, admonishing them to resist not
evil, and teaching them precious spiritual truth. And then, after
a lapse of sixteen centuries, Germany is drenched with blood for
thirty years, cities and villages are burnt, women and children are
murdered by wholesale—and all under the supposed banner of that
gentle mystic of Nazareth. Is there any thought more tragically
solemn for the modern man than the frequent contrast between
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the seed that is sown and the harvest that is garnered? How in-
finitely pregnant are the lines of Goethe in his magnificent poem
"Ilmenau":
"Wer kennt sich selbst? Wer weiss, was er vermag?
Hat nie der Mutige Verwegnes unternommen ?
Und was du tust, weiss erst der andre Tag,
War es zum Schaden oder Frommen."
Thus the way was prepared for a variety of tragedy in which
the tragic pathos should not depend entirely on the old idea of
poetic justice—that is, the meting out of death to him who had
caused death—but in part at least on the disparity between well-
meant effort and calamitous results. The drama, however, can
not represent the long lapse of time necessary in real life for the
complete working out of consequences. If we are to be truly im-
pressed in the theater with the disparity between effort and achieve-
ment, then fate must, so to speak, get in its work at once, and its
havoc be made visible on the spot.
The general basis of a tragedy of fanaticism would be, then,
something like this : A man of noble nature who means well by his
fellow-men, but is endowed with an impetuous temper, strong con-
victions, and an intense narrow vision capable of seeing only in a
straight line ahead, makes havoc of life for himself and others and
leaves us with a heightened feeling for the mysterious tangle of
human destiny which makes it possible for such a man to go thus
fatally wrong. Of course fanaticism may enter into a play in other
ways without constituting what I call a tragedy of fanaticism.
It may be represented, for example, as an object of detestation.
Such is the case with Voltaire's play to which he gave the title of
"Fanaticism, or Mahomet the Prophet." His hero is a fanatic, but
at the same time a conscious impostor, engaged in deceiving the
world.
"II faut m'aider a tromper I'univers,"
says Mahomet ; and again,
"On veritable ou faux, mon culte est necessaire."
The gist of Voltaire's plot is this : On his return to Mecca
Mahomet has among his devoted adherents a pair of lovers, Seide
and Palmire, who are in reality brother and sister, having been,
stolen from their father Zopire in infancy and brought up near the
prophet in ignorance of their relationship. Mahomet is in love
with the girl, and he also wishes to get rid of Zopire, the old sheik
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of Mecca, who is an obstacle in his path. So he commands Seide
to kill the old man, declaring that such is the will of heaven. Seide
does the murder reluctantly and finds out too late that he has slain
his own father. When the truth is disclosed Palmire commits suicide.
Mahomet is left triumphant in Mecca, no nemesis overtaking him
except his disappointment at not getting the girl. Such a play
hardly does the work of tragedy at all, because its hero is both
a monster and a fraud. He arouses no sympathy whatever—only
a certain pity for his dupes and their victim.
Again, there are plays in which fanaticism, instead of being
the mainspring of the action, is the sinister power against which
the hero dashes himself to death. Such, for example, is Gutzkow's
"Uriel Acosta." A high-minded Jewish free-thinker of Amster-
dam in the time of Spinoza, Acosta incurs the bitter hatred of the
bigoted Jews of his entourage. They intrigue against him. Com-
pelled to choose between his liberalism and the woman that he
loves, he first recants his heterodoxy in the synagogue ; then, when
he hears that the young woman has been given to another man after
all, he recants his recantation, hurls defiance at the bigots and dies
by his own hand. This I should call a tragedy, not of fanaticism,
but of liberalism.
The real tragedy of fanaticism, as I have tried to disengage
it, begins with Schiller's "Robbers." The bandit chief Karl Moor
was conceived by Schiller as a "sublime criminal," his sublimity
consisting in his large-heartedness and his emotional susceptibility.
Moor is essentially a friend of man, who runs amuck at society
for its own good. He really believes, for a while at least, that he
is doing a noble work. It is, to be sure, a private wrong—his
being cast off by his father—which moves him to become a captain
of outlaws ; but the private wrong is after all only the spark which
fires the combustible material that has long been gathering in his
mind in the shape of a passionate conviction that society has all
gone wrong in pusillanimity, meanness and injustice. So he under-
takes to right things with gim and sword and torch ; to punish the
bad, reward the good, correct the inequalities of fortune and do
justice between man and man. Such a wild scheme of social
betterment no doubt seems rather boyish, but there is no need to
dwell on that familiar criticism. With all its extravagance, there
is something wonderfully vital about Schiller's first play, so that
Tolstoy was justified in reckoning it among the really significant
modern dramas. What Karl Moor undertakes to do is very like
what the Terrorists of France essayed a few years later in the
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streets of Paris. It is the revolutionary idea gone mad, and we
have learned that matters are not really to be mended in that way
—dynamiters and militant suffragettes to the contrary notwith-
standing.
But note in the "Robbers" a new variety of tragic pathos. In
the end the robber chief comes to see that he has botched his work
all along. At the outset he was the credulous victim of a miserable
intrigue. He had no case against society, but only a case against
his villainous brother. He has scattered death and misery and
terror in his path, and no good has come of his efforts ; the right-
eous gods whom he thought to aid have rejected his assistance.
So he gives himself up to justice and thereby, as Schiller phrases
it, "returns to the track of the law." But this end does not impress
us like that of an ordinary malefactor, or like that of a Macbeth
corrupted by the lust of power. We get the idea of a good man
gone terribly wrong through short-sightedness and miscalculation,
—the idea, in short, of a sublime madman.
If this were a treatise, instead of a short article, I should pass
in review a number of other plays involving a more or less fanatical
assault on the social order. It would be interesting to see how the
idea has been worked out at different epochs by playwrights of
differing temper and nationality. We should hardly find it a
favorite type of tragedy, but we should find that, ever since the
Revolution, the conflict of the individual with the social order bulks
large in the history of the drama. It is, however, the theme of
more comedies and tragi-comedies than of tragedies. Why is this?
Partly, I presume, because the fanatic is not intrinsically a pleasant
type to work with. It is hard to excite sympathy for him. Ever
since the days of Don Quixote the too vehement champion of an
idea, even if we are willing to admit the idea as good in the. abstract,
is more apt to impress us with his folly than with the beauty of
his idealism. And just in proportion as his fanaticism has an
intellectual basis and grows out of a stern conviction that he is right
against the world and that the eternal powers are on his side, are
we the more prone to withhold our sympathy. This is perhaps
because the modern man has discovered that life is too complex
to be reduced to a form.ula. We distrust the man of one idea. We
live by ideals ; but we demand that the ideal shall creep before it
walks, and shall walk before it rides over us rough-shod. In art
as in life we tolerate the slave of an emotion more readily than
the slave of a formula.
All this means that the fanatic is not readily available for
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tragedy, and that to make him palatable requires a dramatist of
peculiar endowment. Young Schiller had this endowment in abun-
dant measure. His Fiesco is a chip from the same block as Karl
Moor, and his Posa is the prince of fanatics—the very Mth power
of sublime altruism divorced from common sense. Goethe, on the
other hand, had no affinity for the type under consideration. In
general, tragedy was not his affair, and when he did essay it his
favorite type of hero was the sentimental weakling who is done to
death not by any bold dream of human betterment, but by his own
lack of will and stamina.
In the work of the Romantic School—I speak now more par-
ticularly of Germany, where I am most at home—the fanatic plays
no role of any importance. Reading "Almansor" one surmises
that Heine might have done something with him, but Heine early
quit the drama, and his two plays are nothing but milestones in the
career of a lyric poet. For Kleist and Grillparzer the type seems
to have had no interest. In the more recent German drama the
fanatic shows his head here and there, but his great modern expo-
nent is Henrik Ibsen.
There was something in Ibsen's blood which disposed him to the
close study and delineation of the fanatic temper. Like Schiller
he took a great criminal for his first hero, idealizing Catiline as a
would-be saviour of Roman society. In his later plays the ever
recurring theme is some strenuous ideal demand in conflict with
the established forms of life. He has given us a considerable
number of characters who are more or less infected with the bacillus
of fanaticism. In the later plays the idea works out variously, al-
ways with results calamitous if not technically tragic. But it is in
the earlier "Brand" that we have Ibsen's greatest achievement in the
line under consideration. Let us glance at "Brand" by way of con-
clusion.
An aspiring priest of many amiable qualities has convinced
himself that society's corroding disease is half-heartedness, the
spirit of compromise, being a little of this and a little of that, but
nothing long and in earnest. He has made up his mind that for his
single self he willstand fast and hew straight to the line of duty
all the time. He carries out this program of life. Winning the
gentle Agnes away from her artist lover Einar, he marries her and
makes her the willing partner of his narrow ascetic life. He refuses
to shrive his old mother and to comfort her on her death-bed be-
cause she resists his ideal demand of "all or nothing." His child
succumbs to the cold and hardship of the wretched house in which
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he insists on living for the pursuit of his calling. His beloved wife
pines away and dies. He is left alone, but still he persists. His
strenuous demands bring him into conflict with his parish. The
people stone him. He retreats up the mountain-side in half-insane
bewilderment, and there is overwhelmed by an avalanche, while a
mysterious voice proclaims above the desolation that God is a God
of love.
I had often read "Brand" and admired it as literature before it
fell to my lot to see it on the stage in the National Theater at
Christiania. Not until then were its marvelous dramatic power and
its terrible tragic pathos fully borne in upon me. The conclusion
is perhaps a little cryptic. Ibsen's exact meaning is debatable and
has been much debated. That, however, is of little moment, for
what great tragedy is there of which the same would not be more
or less true? Enough that we are left with a heightened feeling for
the mystery of life and a vivid sense of the possible disparity between
well-meant endeavor and its earthly consequences. The play seems
to say that there is an over-ruling, ineluctable and inscrutable power
manifesting itself in the complex order of our lives ; that to this
order belong not only our convictions and rules of conduct, but also
our instincts, passions, affections, and even what we call the weak-
ness and vulgarity of human nature ; and that, when a shortsighted
man, conceiving himself as the infallible organ and agent of that
power, undertakes to carry out an inflexible rule of conduct, he may
be expected to do evil instead of good and himself to end in disaster.
This I judge to be the most important new phase of the old Aristo-
telian katharsis, just as I find that the dramatic possibilities of the
type we have been considering are more effectively realized in
"Brand" than in any other recent play with which I am acquainted.
It is our greatest recent tragedy of fanaticism.
